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Patterns in the Nominal
Exchange Rates
Inthis part, I consider the evolution of foreign-sector regimes in the period
since the Great Depression. Since more information is available for recent
years (at least through 1970), and recent policies more directly constrain
future choices, I emphasize the later years of the period. The discussion has
two major foci: (i) presentation of the policies utilized during the phases of
this period; and (ii) analysis of the effects of such policies on price- and cost-
related variables—PLD-NERs, PLD-EERs, PLD-EER(PI)s, ITRs, EPRs,
and DRCs.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In section 3.1 of this chapter, 1 delineate the institutional responsibility for ex-
change regulation since 1931, thus providing a framework for the subsequent
consideration of foreign-sector policies. It should be noted that the loci of
decision-making power have varied substantially over time, with the Central
Bank often having little power. Exchange-rate policy, therefore, generally has
not been the sole component of the Central Bank's discretionary monetary
policy.1 To the contrary, the Central Bank has at times had a very limited in-
fluence over exchange-rate policy.
In section 3.2 I examine the patterns of the major NERS and PLD-NERs
for the 1931—72 period, the former because they are a major component of
EERs—although clearly not the only one, as will be discussed in Chapter 4—
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the latter because of the considerable inflation which Chile has experienced
for years (see line 2.1 in Table A.!):
i. Repeatedly, NERs have been devalued and then held constant at the
new level. Even if the initial devaluation in a cycle was to an equilibrium level,
however, the internal inflation caused the associated PLD-NERs to decline
quickly. Therefore, a disequilibrium situation soon developed, usually leading
to a loss in reserves, an increase in restrictiveness, and an eventual de facto
devaluation (thus beginning another cycle).
ii. De facto devaluations often have been implemented by switching items
from one NER to another instead of actually changing the NERs.
iii. The sliding-peg NER policy of 1965—70 resulted in a relatively stable
PLD-NER, but its level was probably below the long-run equilibrium level.
iv. The secular trend in the over-all mean PLD-NER has been downward
at an exponential average of over 5 per cent per year for over three decades.
Even during the sliding-peg period, the weighted average of all legal PLD-
NERs fell a total of 8 per cent (in contrast to the intended increase of 2 per
cent per year). The steady and substanial decline has vastly outpaced the long-
run expansion of Chile's receipts of foreign exchange through exports and
capital inflows. Therefore, the NER has been more and more overvalued in a
long-run sense, although export booms and capital inflows sometimes masked
this disequilibrium in the short run.
v. Some phase-coincident patterns have been evident. Each liberalization
started with an increase in the over-all PLD-NER (23 per cent in 1956, but
only about 4 per cent in 1959 and 1965). Each switch to a more restrictive
phase started with a decrease in the over-all PLD-NER. The black-market
PLD-NER increased and the over-all average of legal PLD-NERs decreased
near the end of each phase, with one exception: the black-market PLD-NER
decreased until the very end of the Phase IV period in 1959—61 because con-
vertibility at a fixed NER was maintained to the end of that phase.
vi. The dispersion among legal NERs sometimes was quite considerable.
For example, the ratio of the gold NER to the official NER was 9.8 in 1953.
Such variances generally were reduced on average during liberalization at-
tempts but not eliminated, except in 1959—61.
vii. The legal NER used for invisibles (i.e., the broker rate) generally
was increased substantially relative to the NERs for merchandise at times of
exchange shortages and extensive exchange control.
viii. The ratio of the black-market NER to the weighted average of all
legal NERs ranged from about 1.0 in 1959—61 to 10.0 in 1972. Generally, the
black-market PLD-NER moved inversely to the over-all average of legal PLD-
NERs. This negative correlation reflects the greater severity of exchange con-
trol and, therefore, stronger demand in the black market when the legal
PLD-NERs were high compared to times when they were low. f
__________
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3.1INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
tie EXCHANGE CONTROL
Decree Law of July 30, 1931 supplemented by Law 5107 of April 19,
ng 1932 instituted exchange control and established the Exchange Control Corn-
mission (Comisión de Cambios Internacionales)Theeffect of the five main
provisions of the enacting legislation was to shift considerable control over
ns foreign-exchange operations from the Central Bank to the new commission
and to limit substantially the scope of private operations: (i) the Central Bank
1e alone could buy and sell foreign exchange; (ii) the Central Bank fixed the
official rate used by large-scale mining enterprises; (iii) the commission de-
termined other rates; (iv) the commission allocated foreign exchange, with
preference to be given to raw materials, prime necessities, and drugs; (v) the
b- commission had control over exports. Nitrate, iron, iodine, and copper ex-
ier porters were required to purchase domestic currency to cover "legal costs of
ig- production." All other exporters were required to obtain export permits and
nd to return all foreign-exchange earnings to Chile.
a Over the next decade the control system became quite complicated, with a
ed multitude of rates, specified uses, and independent agencies involved. An ex-
ample is given by the summary in Table 3.1 of the sources and uses of foreign
exchange in February 1942. This complex system was perceived to have
ut caused many inefficiencies. Moreover, it reputedly was administered in an
ye arbitrary manner, with frequent unanticipated and unpublicized changes. The
:et Emergency Power Act (Law 7200 of July 21, 1942) was intended to sim-
plify the system somewhat. The Consejo Nacional de Comercio Exterior
(CONDECOR; National Council of Foreign Commerce) was created to re-
-n- place the Exchange Control Commission, the Export Control Service (Servicio
de Control de Exportaciones), the Import License Commission (CornisIon de
e. J Licenciade Importaciones), and the National Supply Agency (Junta Nacional
3. de Abastecimientos). In addition, the power to fix all exchange rates was re-
turned to the Central Bank.
Law 8403 of December 29, 1945 (by which Chile ratified the Bretton
ly Woods Agreement) introduced further procedural reforms. One of these was
of that an annual foreign-exchange budget (presupuesto dedevisas)was to be
drawn up each September for the following calendar year to aid in the distri-
til bution of foreign exchange.
Law 9839 of November 1950 further altered the exchange control system
by (i) redefining the membership of CONDECOR in an attempt to make it
II- more technical and less subject to specific private interests; (ii) replacing the
annual foreign-exchange budget by a more flexible system in which expected






Sources and Uses of Foreign Exchange in Chile in February 1942
Source Sold to Use
1.Exchange of dollars for escu-
dos to pay domestic cost of
production in large-scale









copper mining (Caja de
Crédito Minero)
Central Bank To provide exchange




a. Amounts agreed upon with
government at 0.01937
escudos per dollar
Caja de AmortizaciónTo provide exchange
at 0.031 and 0.025
escudos per dollar
b. Cost of production from
compensation "A" account
exchange
Compensation Office To provide exchange
for compensation
countries
c. Remainder at 0.025
escudos per dollar
Caja de AmortizaciónTo provide exchange
at 0.025 escudos
per dollar
4.Gold sales at 0.031 escudos
per dollar
Central Bank To provide exchange
at 0.03 1 escudos
per dollar
5.Other commodity exports
a. Quotas from 1.0—20.0
per cent of value at
0.01937 escudos per dollar
Central Bank Government foreign
expenses
b. Specified important agri-
cultural exports at 0.031
escudos per dollar
Commercial banks To provide exchange
at 0.031 escudos
per dollar
c. Other exports at 0.025
escudos per dollar
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TABLE 3.1 (concluded)
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Source Sold to Use
6.Private funds
a. Legally sold funds at Caja de AmortizaciónTo provide funds at
free-fund rate free-fund rate
b. Illegal or black-market Black-market dealersTo provide funds at
funds . black-market
rate
7.Tax revenues, payable in
foreign exchange
a.1 8 per cent tax on profits Government Service of foreign
of large-scale copper debt or sold at
mining 0.03 1 escudos per
dollar
b.I 5 per cent tax on profits Government Use of CORFO or
of large-scale copper sold at 0.025 or
mining (earmarked for 0.03 I escudos per
CORFO) and 1.25 cents (lollar
per pound of increased
price paid by Metal
Reserve Corporation
c. 25 per cent of profits of Government Foreign debt service
Nitrate and Iodine Market-
ing Corporation, part of
duties on imports of
petroleum, and on copper
and nitrate production
8.Export-Import Bank $12 Government Use of CORFO or




movimiento de devisas); and (iii) giving commercial banks and other entities
the right to undertake foreign-exchange operations with the prior authoriza-
tion of
The switch to a Phase III regime as part of the Klein-Saks-Ibaflez stabili-
zation program was accompanied by further changes in the institutional re-
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1956, replaced CONDECOR by the Foreign Exchange Commission (Corn-
isbn de Cambios Internacionales; COCAIN) and gave the Central Bank much
more control over the exchange market. The obligation to approve an annual
budget of expected exchange needs was eliminated. Commercial banks were
authorized to operate in the bank spot market, but could sell foreign exchange
only in amounts indicated on prior-deposit certificates (see subsection 4.1.4,
below). Various exchange dealers, tourist agencies, and hotels were authorized
to operate in the free brokers' market.
The liberalization to a Phase IV regime as part of the Alessandri stabili-
zation program resulted in additional changes in institutional responsibilities.
After January 27, 1959, commercial banks were allowed to deal in all classes
of foreign exchange and monetary instruments in the brokers' market. Decree
Law 250 of April 6, 1960, moreover, incorporated the Foreign Exchange
Commission into the Central Bank. The Central Bank thus had more control
over exchange operations than it had had since 1931.
The reversal to a Phase II regime in 1962 diminished somewhat the role
of the Central Bank vis-à-vis the rest of the government but not relative to the
private sector. Exchange control remained under the supervision of the
foreign trade department of the bank, but the Treasury began to receive foreign
loans without Central Bank intermediation. Only commercial banks were al-
lowed to operate in the bank spot market (until December 17, 1963, when
commercial banks were restricted to the bank future market). Commercial
banks and authorized dealers (until the latter were excluded on May 3, 1963)
were allowed to operate in the brokers' market.
For the return to Phase III associated with the Frei stabilization attempt,
which began in 1965, the institutional arrangements remained basically the
same. The foreign trade department and the department of international trans-
actions of the Central Bank continued to be in charge of the exchange control
system. Some functions of the former department were delegated to local com-
missions in important cities. Control over all imports of the copper industry
was entrusted to the Copper Corporation (CODELCO). Imports for the
public sector were supervised by the Interministerial Import Committee for
the Public Sector (which included Central Bank representatives). Beginning
July 31, 1965, hotels were permitted to accept foreign exchange in payment of
travelers' normal hotel charges, and certain hotels in remote areas were per-
mitted to accept foreign exchange for other purposes as well. Beginning De-
7, 1967, all transactions in foreign securities were made subject to
Central Bank authorization. Such modifications in institutional responsibilities,
however, were relatively minor.
The initial institutional arrangements for exchange control under the
Allende government were the same as in the previous phase, with operations
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exchange transactions the responsibility of other government agencies. Sub-
sequent modifications were made, however, when the regime reverted to a
Phase II type as part of the over-all attempt to increase government control.
Central Bank Circular 1510 of April 28, 1971, excluded all but state-owned
banks from operations in the brokers' market. Under Superintendent of Banks
Circular 31 of September 6, 1971, all banks were required to inform the
Central Bank regularly about the magnitude of credit lines abroad. Under
Central Bank Executive Committee Circular 1015 of December 22, 1971,
banks authorized to deal in foreign exchange lost the right to maintain positions
in foreign exchange or in gold (although on August 4, 1972, this right was
reinstated subject to quotas).
3.2 MAJOR TRENDS IN NOMINAL
r EXCHANGERATES (NERs) AND PRICE-
LEVEL-DEFLATED NERs (PLD-NERs)
Exchange-rate policy is a principal component of any foreign-sector regime.
m Formost of the years since 1931, Chile has had an explicit multiple-exchange-
rate system. The main average annual NERs for 1931—72 are shown in Table
A.7. Because of the substantial inflation (cf. line 2.1 in Table A.1), however,
PLD-NERs are of much more interest than the NERs.3 Table 3.2 contains
the major average annual PLD-NERs for the same period. In the following
column-by-column discussion, primary emphasis is given to the bank spot rate
and the brokers' rate because these have been the most important ones during
the past two decades.
3.2.1Official PLD-NER.
The official NER (called the special rate after 1942) was set by the
Bank for the following uses: (i) government imports; (ii) the legal
cost of production and local costs of investment (until 1947) for large-scale
mining; and (iii) the conversion of proceeds of almost all other exports at a
varying quota (1—20 per cent) after September The official NER was
reduced substantially in the 1932—34 period, then increased to the level at
which it remained fixed for the next two decades (column 1 in Table A.7).
The Nuevo Trato of 1955 ended the use of this rate for large-scale copper
mining (see subsection 4.2.1). Law 12018 of April 23, 1956, eliminated the
last use of this rate, which was for part of the proceeds from nitrate exports.
A constant NER for two decades—given the substantial domestic price
increases—implies a tremendous decline in the official PLD-NER (column 1
in Table 3.2). The PLD-NER for 1956 was only 2 per cent of that for 1939.
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TABLE 3.2




(specialExport (parity after Black or
Phase andafter 1942)Draft GoldWineDec. 1946)aFree Marketb
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I-I'
1931 6.301 I0.679d
1932 7.050 16.959 12.5441
1933 4.450 11.067 11.341
1934 3.232 8.404 8.381
1935 6.480 8.133 8.381
1936 5.901 7.932 l0.658d 8.526
1937 7.318 9.664l2.845d 10.578 9.822
1938 7.677 9.889 13.480d 11.205 10.702
1939 7.900 10.188 12.614 13.051
1940 7.174 9.251 11.451 12.156
1941 5.869 7.575 9.393 9.558
1942 4.966 6.410 7.948 8.110
1943 4.210 5.434 6.739 6.991
1944 3.654 4.716 5.849 5.949
1945 3.521 4.545 5.636 5.827
1946 2.980 3.846 4.769 5.297
1947 2.333 3.012 3.734 5.681
1948 1.956 2.525 3.131 6.136
1949 1.641 2.11810.470 2.627 6.361 3
1950 1.403 9.901 2.246 6.637 3
1951 1.159 8.048 6.582 1.856 5.377 5
1952 0.944 8.027 6.491 1.512 5.951 5
1953 0.750 7.341 6.582 4.263 7.286 4
1954 0.446 5.641 2.534 7.718 2
1955 0.256 4.625 1.456 7.483 2
III
1956 0.162 0.920 4.401 3
1957 0.717 5.218 4
1958 0.568 5.684 4
Iv
1959 0.404 3.891 3
1960 3.548 3
1961 3.295 3






























































































SOURCE: The sources for the NERs and EERs are given in Table A.7. The deflator
for 1931—39 is the wholesale price index; for 1940—71 it is the GDP deflator from the
CORFO and ODEPLAN national accounts; and for 1972. a weighted average of the
consumer and wholesale price indices (with weights of 0.667 for the former and 0.333
for the latter).
a. After June 1959 calculations of the IMF for Chilean reserves and balance of

































3.1283.310 3.131 3.739 3.237
3.0823.117 3.082 3.623 3.117
3.0453.045 3.045 3.448 3.075





3.7643.236 2.749 3.298 3.3474.605 5.024
b. Endof June for 1948—72.
c. Weighted average of legal
d. End of year.
e. See note fin Table Al.
1.See note g in Table A.7.
g. Weighted average of the
notes f and g of Table A.7.
exchange rates.
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Over the years, the decline in this rate manifested itself, ceteris paribus, in
increasing incentives for government imports, decreasing incentives to use b
local factors in large-scale mining, and decreasing incentives to export generally. 1
3.2.2Export Draft PLD-NER.
e
The export draft NER was first quoted in August 1931. It was initially a
free rate at which exporters other than those in large-scale mining could sell
tI
directly to importers or use their proceeds to do their own importing. Banks
S
were sometimes intermediaries in these transactions. In 1935, however, be- d
cause of the scarcity of exchange, the Exchange Control Commission required
e
that beginning in September 1936 all transactions be handled by the banks at q
a fixed rate.
The export draft NER followed approximately the same pattern as the
official NER, but generally at about a 30 per cent higher level (column 2 in
a
Table A.7). A decline in 1933—35 was followed by an increase in 1936 be-
cause the NER was fixed at a high level in that year owing to an exchange
shortage in late 1935 and early 1936. Then the export draft NER was reduced
in 1937 to the level at which it remained about constant for the next twelve
years.
Although the export draft PLD-NER (column 2 in Table 3.2) rose in 3
the late 1930s, it was 10 to 24 per cent lower than the new free funds PLD-
NER (column 5ofthe table). Pressures therefore increased for use of the
former for imports and the latter for exports. The Exchange Control Corn-
mission responded in 1939 first by allowing only imports of goods designated
as "essential" at the export draft NER and then by continually reducing the
number of goods so designated. After 1939 the commission also yielded to
pressure from exporters to reclassify their nonquota returns (i.e., those which
were not required to be converted at the official rate) from the export draft
NER to the free funds NER. The export draft NER subsequently was used
0 less and less and not at all after 1949, by which time the export draft PLD-




The gold NER was established after the exchange shortage of late 1935
and early 1936 to cover luxury imports and travel abroad. The source of ex-
change was sales from the government-run gold office. Since this office pur- Ii
chased gold at the equivalent of 0.02711 escudos per dollar, and the gold NER r
was at first 0.0300 escudos per dollar and subsequently (after October 30, q
1936) 0.0350 escudos per dollar, the government acquired revenue directly r
______________
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from these transactions. The gold rate was legally abolished in December 1936,
but sales continued de facto at 0.030 and 0.035 escudos per dollar. In August
1937 these rates were lowered, respectively, to 0.029 and 0.034. At the be-
ginning of 1938 the special NER for gold exports was discontinued and the
export draft NER was applied to gold exports.
Almost eleven years later, in response to pressure from gold-mine owners,
Law 9270 of December 1948 was passed, authorizing CONDECOR to allow
ly a the importation of any articles paid for by foreign exchange received from the
sell sale of domestically produced gold (subject to a semiannual quota set by presi-
inks dential decree). Thus, the gold rate was reinstated. In 1954 it became mop-
be- erative as a result of the government's decision not to announce the semiannual
quota.
•at / Throughout its existence the gold NER exceeded all other NERs including
the black-market rate. In the 1949—53 period, for example, the gold NER
the averaged 2.6 times the weighted average of all legal rates (i.e., the national
Ifl accountsrate) and 1.3 times the black-market rate (cf. columns 3, 6, and 13 in
be- Tables 3.2 and A.7). The differential between the gold and black-market rates
tnge reflected the high cost of smuggling the type of goods, e.g., consumer durables,
iced for which the former was used.
in 3.2.4Wine PLD-NER.
The wine NER was established in 1951 by CONDECOR for a list of non- t e essential items which, if import licenses were granted, could be imported with
foreign exchange received from wine exports. Initially this rate was kept at
0.020 escudos per dollar above the flexible bank spot NER. For the last quar-
ter of 1952 and part of 1953, use of the wine NER was suspended, and
wine export proceeds were converted at the lower free funds NER because
• CONDECOR and the Central Bank decided that foreign exchange could not
sed be spared for nonessential goods. In February 1953 the wine NER was set at
-.D 0.060 escudos per dollar above the fixed free funds NER. In May 1954 it was
adjusted to 0.150 escudos per dollar above the free funds dollar rate and at
0.120 escudos per dollar above the conversion rate for all other currencies. In
October 1955 it was replaced by the special-area NER under which listed non-
essentials could be imported, using the export proceeds of wine and a few
other products, at almost double the old wine rate (again, subject to the grant-
)35 ing of import permits).
The wine NER averaged about 16 per cent below the gold rate for over-
- lappingyears, but about 109 per cent above the weighted average of all legal
R rates. The added return for wine exports, as in the case of gold exports, was
0, quite substantial because these activities were accorded preferential exchange-
tly rate treatment.
in
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3.2.5Free Funds PLD-NER.
The free funds NER (disponibilidades propias) was established in 1937
to serve the same basic functions as the gold rate. However, over the years,
this NER covered more and more imports as the Exchange Control Commis-
sion declared increasing numbers of goods to be luxuries due to the shortages
of exchange at the export draft NER. The excess demand for exchange at the
latter rate was intensified in 1940, when all minerals produced by domestically
owned companies were reclassified from the export draft to the free funds
NER, and in 1941, when certain agricultural exports (e.g., fruits and wines),
manufactured goods, and specified returns on services were similarly reclassi-
fied. By the end of 1941 most imports, except for those traditionally deemed
essential (e.g., drugs, sugar, newsprint), were transacted at the free funds
NER.
In 1946, in response to an IMF inquiry, the parity free funds NER was
given as 0.031 escudos per dollar. In that same year this rate was established
for use of the 1—20 per cent quotas on the conversion of proceeds from small-
and medium-scale mining mentioned above in the discussion of the official
NER.
Because of serious balance-of-payments problems in 1948, approximately
the same exports which had been reclassified to the free funds rate in 1940 and
1941 plus machinery and equipment, some invisibles, and "necessary" im-
ports (i.e., neither luxuries nor goods of primary importance) were reclassi-
fled to the new higher bank spot NER. At the same time essential imports and
less favored exports (e.g., wool and fish products) were raised to the free
funds rate from the export draft rate.
The free funds NER was maintained at 0.031 escudos per dollar and sub-
sequently was used less and less, although at the end of 1951 it was still utilized
for the liquidation of some insurance, minimum quotas on the proceeds of
certain agricultureal exports (35 per cent for bran, hides, skins, wax, and wool
and 20 per cent for lentils, frozen meat, and chick peas); and for imports of
certain government items, necessities (drugs, antibiotics, sugar, newsprint,
tallow, wheat, and flour), and some invisible items. On October 5, 1953, the
IMF sanctioned an increase from 0.031 to 0.110 escudos per dollar for the
parity rate, which thereafter remained fixed at this level. But after several years
the PLD-NER had declined so much (see below), that the parity was no longer
utilized. After 1959 quotations were no longer given for the free funds NER.
The free funds PLD-NER declined monotonically from 1939 through
1952, with a value in 1952 of less than 12 per cent of the 1939 value (column
5 in Table 3.2). The parity change in 1953 increased this PLD-NER by a
factor of 2.8 in comparison to the previous year—but only to about a third ofEXCHANGE CONTROL INSTITUTIONS AND PATTERNS IN THE NERs 73
the 1939 level. By 1959 the PLD-NER had declined to 9 per cent of the 1953
value and to 3 per cent of the 1939 value.
3.2.6Black-or Free-MarketPLD-NER.
The black- or free-market NER varied substantially over the years. op-
erations in this market were not legally recognized before November 1950,
when CONDECOR was authorized to use it for capital transferred to Chile in
the form of foreign exchange for uses other than in large-scale mining, or after
1961. Nevertheless, this NER has played important roles as an index of the
tightness of exchange control in the other foreign-exchange markets and as an
index of economic and political expectations.5
The black market developed immediately after the initiation of exchange
control, in mid-1931. It originally was the only source of foreign exchange for
many invisible imports as well as for imports of unauthorized goods, and was
utilized quite extensively in the early and mid-i 930s. The subsequent estab-
lishment of the gold and free funds NERs provided alternative legal markets
for many foreign-exchange operations; so demand shifted downward in the
black market.
When exchange control was tightened after World War II, black-market
activity expanded again—especially during the near-hyperinflation in 1954
and 1955. In the first decade after the war, the black-market PLD-NER
tended to increase regularly except during the boom years in the copper market,
touched off by the Korean War (column 6 in Table 3.2). In the period of
political and economic chaos of 1954—55, substantial capital flight occurred
through this market. As a result, the ratio of the black-market NER to the
national accounts NER reached 3.17—the highest level recorded before 1971
(also see Chart 1.1).
During the post-1955 phases, four characteristics of the evolution of the
black-market PLD-NER stand out: (i) During the 1959—61 Phase IV period
exchange control decreased so much that the black-market rate did not differ
significantly from the legal rates. (ii) At the start of each of the three stabiliza-
tion programs this PLD-NER fell considerably below its level of the preceding
year: 31 per cent in 1956, 32 per cent in 1959, and 12 per cent in 1965 (but
to 35 per cent below the 1964 level by 1967). These drops partially reflected
declines in exchange control in the legal markets. (iii) In each of the three
presidential election years—1958, 1964, and 1970—the black-market PLD-
NER increased somewhat because of related political uncertainties. (iv) After
the 1970 election of Allende, the black-market PLD-NER soared to historical
highs because of fears and uncertainty about the attempt to transform the
economy to socialism.6 The 1972 black-market PLD-NER was 2.2 times the
•1
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previous post-World War II peak of 1954. The ratio of the black-market NER
to the national accounts NER in 1972 averaged over 10.0 compared to a
mean of 1.45 for the entire 1931—72 period.
3.2.7Bank Spot PLD-NER.
• In February 1948, in response to a balance-of-payments crisis, the bank
• spot NER was set by Decree 255 of the Ministry of Economics at 0.043
escudos per dollar. Those categories of exports and imports mentioned above
in the discussion of the free funds NER were immediately transferred to this
rate, and large-scale mining companies were allowed to use this rate for con-
verting new investment funds. In January 1950 a provisional NER of 0.060
escudos per dollar largely replaced the bank spot rate. Subsequently, in 1951,
the bank spot NER was increased to 0.0900 and, in turn, replaced the special-
commercial and provisional rates.
In 1953, in probably the single most important attempt to rationalize the
exchange-rate system in the 1931—55 phase, decrees 741 and 742 made the
bank spot NER applicable to almost all merchandise imports and to a sub-
stantial portion of merchandise exports. This NER covered approximately 36
per cent of the inflows and 40 per cent of the outflows in the foreign-exchange
budget in the first half of 1953 and approximately 90 per cent of the outflows
in the second half of the year. Substantial excess demand soon developed for
exchange at this rate, however, partly because the price of dollars it implied
relative to the price of the currencies covered in bilateral agreements was
quite low. Moreover, the bank spot PLD-NER declined rapidly (column 7 in
Table 3.2). Therefore, the relatively unified exchange-rate system quickly
evaporated as new restrictions were introduced and items were moved to
other NERs.
After 1955 the bank spot NER again was the dominant rate for goods
transactions. In the 1956—58 Phase III period, it was used for almost all im-
ports and related invisibles, government invisibles, education-related invisibles
(up to certain limits), and capital transfers (subject to the decree of November
10, 1953, discussed below). Exceptions included large-scale mining trade and
imports of certain necessities (e.g., sugar, tea, Paraguayan tea, kerosene)
worth up to $30 million, which were given a rate of 0.300 escudos per dollar
prior to July 1957. Because of frequent devaluations during this phase, includ-
ing a series of incremental changes in the first half of 1957, the bank spot
PLD-NER increased to its highest level since 1953. The 1957 and 1958
• levels, moreover, have not been attained again since that time.
• On January 27, 1959, the Alessandri government introduced a Phase IV
• regime, instituting a unified NER of 1.051 escudos per dollar and in effect de-
valuating the currency. The Instituto de EconomIa [1963:203] and Leftwich
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[1966:407]suggest that, given the trade regime in operation at the time, this
rate was close to equilibrium. From that date until the end of this phase, the
Central Bank maintained fixed NERs (Table A.7) as a symbol of stability.
However, because of continual internal inflation (albeit at a greatly reduced
rate), the PLD-NERs declined steadily (by over 20 per cent between 1958
and 1961 for the bank spot PLD-NER).
After a foreign-exchange crisis at the end of 1961, a Phase II regime with
multiple exchange rates was reintroduced. The bank spot NER initially was
kept constant as a symbol of price stability despite obvious, ever-increasing
disequilibrium. Finally, it was supposedly (but not actually) freed after a 33
per cent devaluation, on October 15, 1962, an act which was encouraged by
the IMF. Because of the continuing foreign-exchange shortage and the Cen-
• tral Bank's continued prevention of adjustments in the bank spot market,
shortages existed at that rate. Therefore the Central Bank increasingly switched
transactions to the bank future NER (see below). The bank spot NER also
was raised, but not enough to arrest the decline in the bank spot PLD-NER
more than temporarily.
In 1965 the new Frei government initiated a Phase III regime. As one
component of that regime, in April 1965 the Central Bank adopted a sliding-
e peg or programmed exchange-rate policy in which small devaluations—
s about 1 per cent at a time—were announced every 15 or 30 days with the
intent of increasing the PLD-NER by about 2.0 per cent per year. That the
bank spot NER was adjusted with great frequency in itself was not such a
s novelty.Monthly adjustments were made in that rate between April 1952 and
January 1953, between April 1956 and January 1959, and between October
1962 and the initiation of this new policy. The novelties, of such a policy in
b the Chilean experience lay in the explicit intent slowly to increase the PLD-
and in the official claim such a policy was advantageous.
A number of a priori advantages have been claimed for the Chilean
sliding-peg exchange-rate policy of this period:(i) Exporters would not be
subjected to wide variations in their returns because of unanticipated exchange-
rate policies or because of substantial fluctuations in the PLD-NER. Instead
they could plan ahead confidently with the guarantee of a slightly increasing
PLD-NER. (ii)Import-substitution activities would not be subjected to
fluctuating protection with relatively high EPRs after a large devalution, then
decreasing EPRs as competitive imports became ever cheaper due to declining
PLD-NERs.8 Such a pattern had occurred repeatedly in the Chilean experience
because of the combination of fixed NERs and internal inflation. Operators of
import-substitution enterprises therefore could plan ahead with much greater
certainty. (iii) Speculators acting with knowledge of frequent small devalua-
tions would have a less destabilizing effect on the market than if there were
infrequent, but large (and profitable, if correctly anticipated) devaluations.
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(iv) Desired inventory holdings would be lowered owing to the relative unlike-
lihood that severe restrictions would be placed on future imports, given the
improved balance of payments resulting from the sliding-peg policy. (Actual
inventories, however, might increase despite a decline in desired inventories if
actual inventories had previously been below desired inventories because of
exchange restrictions.) (v) Average capacity utilization would be increased
because of the constant availability of required imported inputs. (vi) Direct
inflationary pressures would not be increased, except possibly in the short run,
by the series of frequent small devaluations in place of infrequent large devalu-
ations; and the psychological impact of devaluation on inflationary expectations
might be less under the former than under the latter policy.
In Part III, I evaluate some of these claims. At this point it is pertinent to
note, however, that in the six-year experience with the sliding-peg exchange
rate the bank spot PLD-NER generally declined (except in 1968)—despite
officially announced intentions of achieving the contrary (column 7 in Table
3.2).
In July 1970 the sliding-peg policy was discontinued because of the tradi-
tional claims raised by the opposition in the presidential election campaign—
that it was inflationary and that it favored rich foreign and national exporters.
After the election Minister of Finance Américo Zorrilla [1970: 1488] of the
new Allende government announced, on November 27, 1970, that the escudo
would no longer be periodically depreciated and, also, that exchange control
would be intensified.9 The government adopted a fixed bank spot NER as a
symbol of stability 10andproposed to serve as a buffer between external and
internal markets in order to protect the domestic economy from any external
disequilibriums or fluctuations.1' For the first year of the new administration
the bank market NER was in fact kept constant (see Table A.7), although
during this period changes were made in access to that market.12 As a result
the bank spot PLD-NER dropped 16 per cent in 1971 to the lowest level re-
corded since the establishment of the rate in 1948.
The fixed NER symbol was abandoned in December 1971 with a nominal
devaluation of approximately 30 per cent. Exchange control was intensified
and the bank spot rate was replaced by four rates for four detailed lists:
(A) primarily agricultural and petroleum imports, at 12.21 escudos per dollar;
(B) the basic rate for exports, for principal merchandise imports of necessities,
pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, and agricultural inputs, and for invisible imports
and exports related to credits from international organizations and services
from international news agencies and postal and parcel post agencies, at 15.80
escudos per dollar; (C) imports of machinery and parts, imports of non-
essential primary materials, and imports of manufactured products, indemnifi-
cation and premiums for insurance on ships and planes, and inflows and
outflows of financial capital under articles 15 and 16 of Decree 1272 andEXCHANGE CONTROL INSTITUTIONS AND PATTERNS IN THE NERs77
Decree Law 259,at19.00 escudos per dollar; and (D) luxuries and other
nonnecessities, at 25.00 escudos per dollar. This new structure was intended
to favor imports of mass-consumption goods and intermediate inputs.
Because of the accelerating inflation, a further devaluation was imple-
mented, on August 7, 1972, equivalent to a 58percent nominal change in the
basic rate. At the same time, several additional lists were established, making
a total of seven altogether, with rates for the seven ranging from 20 to 80
escudos per dollar. Moreover, the executive committee of the Central Bank
announced that it would establish higher rates for foreign currencies deriving
from nontraditional exports, the promotion of which would be in the natfonal
interest. Despite these two major devaluations in less than eight months, how-
ever, the basic bank market PLD-NER in 1972 fell 38 per cent below the 1971
level to an all-time low. On August 3, 1973, still further changes were made:
the new rates ranged from 25 to 890 escudos per dollar. Nevertheless, owing
to the raging internal inflation, the PLD-NER continued to fall on the average
in 1973.13
r 3.2.8Bank Future PLD-NER.
1.
Thebank future NER was introduced in 1963. Because shortages existed
at the bank spot NER the Central Bank authorized commercial banks to sell
exchange at a bank future NER for necessities (i.e., items with a prior-deposit
requirement not greater than 10 per cent) and to buy exchange at this rate from
the proceeds of exports other than from large-scale mining with delivery to be
effected in less than 90 days. Starting on November 8, 1963, the Central Bank
began quoting the bank future NER at a 20.3 per cent differential from the
spot NER. Effective December 18, 1963, commercial banks were no longer
permitted to buy exchange at the bank spot NER. The effect of this change,
together with a series of changes in 1964 that increased the upper limit of
prior-deposit categories for import items that qualified for the bank future rate,
was to shift almost all merchandise exports other than those from large-scale
mining and all nongovemment merchandise import operations to the bank
future NER. Importers preferred this rate even though it was higher than the
bank spot NER because of the increasing uncertainty and delays they experi-
enced in trying to do business at the latter rate. Thus an effective devaluation
occurred, with large-scale mining once again faced with a discriminatory ex-
change rate since it was legally bound to effect all exchange operations with
the Central Bank at the bank spot NER.
In the early part of the Phase III regime of the Frei government even
greater access to the bank future NER was granted by a series of ten announce-
ments in 1965 and January 1966. On January 10, 1967, the bank spot and
future NERs were unified as part of the attempt to simplify the exchange-S
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control system. Separate but identical quotations were given for each rate
until the December 1971 exchange-rate realignment.
During 1963—66, the four years in which the bank future NER was dis-
tinct from the bank spot NER, the percentage difference declined steadily; it
was 31 per cent in 1963, 16 per cent in 1964, 6 per cent in 1965, and 1 per
cent in 1966. Over the same period of time the bank future PLD-NER dropped
by a third (column 8 in Table 3.2).
3.2.9Special-Commerical PLD-NER.
The special-commercial NER of 0.050 escudos per dollar was introduced
in August 1950 to favor the importation of certain petroleum products, agri-
cultural machinery, raw Cotton, and india rubber. By the end of 1951 it
covered approximately 98 per cent of the export proceeds from nitrates and
iodine, as well as imports of crude oil, gasoline, tea, Paraguayun tea, paraffin,
antibiotics, kerosene, rubber, jute, cellulose, ships, etc., and certain invisible
items. In 1953, it was replaced by the bank spot rate, and has not been in use
since. The special-commercial PLD-NER fell 47 per cent in the four years dur-
ing which it was quoted (column 9 in Table 3.2).
3.2.10Provisional PLD-NER.
The provisional NER of 0.060 escudos per dollar, which is discussed
above in the section on the bank spot rate, was instituted in January 1950 and
not utilized after 1953 except for the conversion of new investment funds for
large-scale mining. The provisional PLD-NER also fell 47 per cent in the
four years during which it was utilized (column 10 in Table 3.2).
3.2.11Central Bank PLD-NER.
The Central Bank NER was first quoted in 1956 at a level 10 per cent
above the bank spot NER. In subsequent years, however, the differential was
much smaller. After 1961 the two rates were identical except in 1965.
3.2.12Brokers' PLD-NER.
The brokers' NER was established in November 1950 for a number of
invisible transactions and for the transfer of capital in the form of foreign
exchange, except for that related to large-scale mining.'4 This was the only
legal NER that was allowed to fluctuate more or less without quantitative
restrictions for any significant period of time. It was relatively free in 1950—55;
at the start of the Phase III period, in 1956; and during the first part of the
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Phase IV years it was virtually identical to the black-market NER (cf. columns
6 and 12 in Table A.7). When the brokers' NER was fixed, the black-market
NER rose to levels as much as 6.2 times as high (in 1972).
Except during the period 1959—61, when exchange rates were unified,
the brokers' NER always has been above the weighted average of all legal
NERs. By the middle of each of the two Phase III periods (1956—58 and
1965—70) such discrepancies had declined to 11 or 12 per cent. In both cases,
however, they increased thereafter. During the three Phase II periods (1950—
56, 1962—64, and 1971 on), such discrepancies were much higher—almost
200 per cent in 1955 and about 60 per cent in 1963 and in 1972. These pat-
terns reflect the practice of using NERs more to limit invisible imports than to
limit merchandise imports at times of exchange shortages.
The secular trend of the brokers' PLD-NER was downward during 1950—
72. However, this pattern is distinct in two respects from that of the over-all
legal PLD-NER (see the discussion of the national accounts rate, below):
(i) The relative decline has been somewhat greater because the brokers' NER
le was a free rate at the beginning and was fixed at an overvalued level at the end
r- ofthis period, while the other legal rates were fixed at overvalued levels at both
the beginning and the end. (ii) The brokers' PLD-NER has increased much
more frequently because at times this NER was free and at other times the
brokers' NER was devalued both more and earlier than NERs applicable to
merchandise transactions."
K! As was the case for the bank spot NER, in late 1971 the brokers' NER
d was split into several rates: the basic rate remained at 28.00 escudos per dollar,
but operations in some invisibles were allowed at the B-list rate of 15.80
escudos per dollar or at the C-list rate of 19.00 escudos per dollar." Further-
more, on August 2, 1972, the brokers' NER was devalued and subdivided into
the following three rates:
Area I. 36.00 escudos per dollar: for re-export of capital investments under
it Article 14 of Decree 1272, expenditures for study abroad, and noncom-
S mercial medicines;
Area II. 46.00 escudos per dollar: for broker market operations not desig-
nated as Area I or Area III;
Area III. 85.00 escudos per dollar: for travel and transportation, pensions
and family help to nonstudent nonresidents, obligatory payments in for-
eign currency abroad by residents in Chile, and extraordinary remittances.
3.2.13NationalAccounts PLD-NER.
The national accounts NER is a statistical entity only. It is calculated by
the national accounts office as a weighted average of all of the legal NERs. As
it
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such, itis a useful composite index of over-all exchange-rate movements.
Examination of the national accounts PLD-NER (column 13 of Table 3.2)
suggests two important features: (i) The weighted average of all PLD-NERs
did not change as sharply as did many of the individual PLD-NERs. This
characteristic reflects the frequent shifting of items to higher exchange-rate
categories in lieu of formal devaluation—all in an environment of considerable
inflation. (ii) From 1940 on, the secular movement in the national accounts
PLD-NER was downward at a mean exponential rate of 5.4 per cent per year
(also see Chart 1.1). During the 32 years from 1940 to 1972, the annual
PLD-NER increased only seven times. In only three of those years—1950,
1957, and 1963—was the increase as large as 5 per cent. The value for 1972
was less than one-sixth of the value for 1940. The strong downward secular
trend in the weighted average of legal PLD-NERs implies that even if the
exchange-rate system had been near equilibrium in the early 1940s, it was
unlikely to have remained there long.17 The resulting disequilibrium system
could not be supported for any significant period of time except through the use
of quantitative restrictions.18
3.2.14Other Rates.
A large number of additional NERs also were in use at various times.
Bilateral and compensation agreements (see subsection 4.1.6) implied the
existence of distinct NERs. From March 30, 1954, until the start of a Phase
III regime in 1956 imports of certain specified products (e.g., liquor, tobacco,
truck chassis, tires) were permitted, subject to authorization, using the export
proceeds of small- and medium-scale mining with different fixed exchange-rate
differentials for each individual import and export item. At the time of the
August 1972 alignment, as is noted above, the Central Bank announced it
would establish special NERs on an individual basis for certain nontraditional
exports.
In general these special NERs did not substantially affect the over-all
average NER. But they did add considerably to the complexity of the system,
increase distortions, and have substantial income distribution implications for
those directly affected.
NOTES
1. Johnson [1971], McKinnon [1971, 19721, and Mundell [1971], among others,
have recently argued that exchange-rate policy is best considered as simply one facet of
monetary management.
2. With the July decree, Chile abandoned the gold standard, thus acting two
months before the pound was devalued, in September 1931, rather than, as Hirschman
[1963:1791 has claimed, in March 1932, six months after the devaluation.L
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3.Of even more interest are the PLD-EERs which incorporate the effects not only
of exchange rates per se, but also of all the other policy tools to be discussed in chapters
4 and 5.Insection 5.1,Iexplore the evolution of PLD-EERs and PLD-EER(PI)s in the
years since the Great Depression.
4. The existence of varying quotas on exports other than from large-scale mining
and of varying legal costs of production rates on large-scale mining implied a
different de facto NER for each export good.
5.Thelatter role is emphasized in Instituto de EconomIa [1956:28]. The determi-
nants of the black-market PLD-NER are investigated in Table A7, note b.
6. The election was on September 4,1970.Between the end of August and the end
of September 1970 the black-market NER increased from 22.8 to 35.0 escudos per
dollar, although it subsequently declined somewhat to a year-end level of 28.0 escudos
per dollar. Picks' [1971: 124] also reports considerable postelection black-market activity
in Chilean escudos in Buenos Aires (almost $13 million's worth in one week with the
cross rate up to 50.0 escudos per dollar at one time) and in Bogota and Quito.
7. Ffrench-Davis and Carrasco [1969:901—904] include many of the following
points in their CentralBankBulletinexplanationof the government rationale for the
policy.
8. EPRs will not necessarily decline as the PLD-NERs decrease even under ceteris
paribus assumptions because the price of inputs might decrease more than the price of
products. However Ffrench-Davis and Carrasco [1969:901—904] claim thatinthe
Chilean experience the EPRs for the import-substitution industries in fact did decrease in
such circumstances. If quantitative restrictions are effective, moreover, PLD-EER(PI)s
may not decline even if PLD-NERs drop substantially.
9. According to de Onis [1971b:9]: "When President Salvador Allende Gossens ran
for office last year, one of his promises was that Chile would 'terminate agreements with
the International Monetary Fund and put an end to the scandalous devaluations of the
escudo.'"
10. The adoption of a fixed NER as a symbol of stability had a certain ironical
aspect to it in that Allesandri, the runner-up in the close presidential election of Septem-
ber 1970, had himself adopted such a symbol twelve years earlier after he had narrowly
defeated Allende in the presidential election of late 1958.
11. For example, the government proposed to protect exporters from any dis-
equilibrium due to domestic price increases and a ftxed NER by an expanded drawback
program (see subsection 4.2.2, below).
12. Substantial changes were also made in the use of import prior deposits (see
subsection 4.1.4., below).
13. After the coup that ousted the Allende government, yet another devaluation
was made, on October 1, 1973.
14. Starting in November 1953, however, the NER for each new foreign investment p
project was negotiated individually.
15. In 1962, for example, the brokers' NER was devalued by 35.1 per cent in
January and a total of 110.2 per cent for the year. The bank spot NER, in contrast,
was held constant until the 33 per cent devaluation of October 15. In July 1971, the
brokers' NER was devalued by 95 per cent, but the bank spot NER was unchanged until
the 30 per cent devaluation in December.
16. Circulars 1672 and 1677 of April 13 and 20, 1972, also established an exchange
rate of 42 escudos per dollar for UNCTAD personnel for the duration of UNCTAD 111.
17. Two assumptions underly this statement: (i) imports and exports were some-
what price responsive; (ii) exports or other sources of foreign exchange did not expand
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sufficiently rapidly to allow such a great decline in the equilibrium NER. See Chapters
6—8forconsideration of both of these assumptions.
18. For indicators of the degree of disequilibrium in recent decades see line 1.1.1
in Table A.! and the estimate in Bacha and Taylor [19731 that the NER was overvalued
by 25to80 per cent in the 1960s.